It is useful at this point to consider political realities in contemporary Iraq. Even though elections were held in December 2005, and a new government with a four-year lifespan has been formed, albeit somewhat belatedly, the political structure and characteristics of Iraq are far from what the US administration would deem to be in keeping with an ‘ideal’ model.
The first hope of the ‘ideal’ model was that Iraq would be a bastion of secular democracy. This has clearly not happened. Even if it is accepted that Iraq is on the pathway to becoming democratic in a Western sense (and this is a big assumption), the most influential political group in Iraq are those who identify themselves as Shi’a Muslims, who follow one of several religiously based political parties.
The second hope, even expectation, of the US was that Iraq would be united by a strong and vibrant sense of Iraqi nationalism. Whether Arab Sunni, Arab Shi’a, Turkmen, Kurd or Assyrian, it was taken for granted that all would subscribe to a cohesive sense of Iraqi-ness. This did not happen. Instead, ethno-sectarian identities rapidly established themselves as the principal means of social organization and political mobilization. This fracturing of the political space in Iraq, combined with the chaotic devolution of power, opened up fissures which could be exploited by neighbouring powers and other formations such as Salafi-Jihadi militants. In this complex environment, Iran and other states would find it easy to create networks of patronage and build a portfolio of locally effective parties, militias, and organizations which could all be influenced to act in their interests.
The third hope was that the emergence of a democratic Iraq would take place relatively quickly. Over three years after the removal of the Ba’th regime from power, it is clear that Iraq is far from stable and will almost certainly require the MNF to remain for some time in order to prevent absolute collapse, possible fragmentation, and the continuing strengthening of the forces of radical
Islamism deemed inimical to US interests.
The great problem facing the US is that Iran has superseded it as the most influential power in Iraq. This influence has a variety of forms but all can be turned against the US presence in Iraq with relative ease, and almost certainly would heighten US casualties to the point where a continued presence might not be tenable. Sources in Iraq are already warning that the major cities (including Basra and Baghdad) have witnessed a rise in the activities of Iranian paramilitary units and the recent bout of violence and instability in Basra is now considered to be a small display of what would happen if Iran itself was targeted.
You can say many, many, bad things about Saddam Hussein, but one thing you could not say is that he was an ally of Iran. By their incomprehensibly stupid invasion of the nation they have managed to create a gigantic, chaotic place that is going to go from a check on Iranian power to an ally; as well as handcuff the flexibility of any military response being a real threat.
Now, thanks to Bush -- and no matter how much Bill Kristol masturbates to the prospect, taking military action against Iran will be an unmitigated disaster for the American military.
Bush may not realize it (which is quite frightening) but he has managed to put us in a fucking box full of scorpions with no real method of escape without getting stung...and if he follows his puny heart and operates against Iran, thousands more American troops will be stung to death.
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