January 26, 2007:
Last October, my sources began telling me about rumblings among the insurgent strategists suggesting that their murderous endeavor was about to run out of steam. This sense of fatigue began registering among mid-level insurgent commanders in late December, and it has devolved to the rank and file since then. The insurgents have begun to feel that the tide has turned against them.
October 25, 2006:
Iraq is succeeding because the Iraqi state has weathered the worst of the insurgent storm and survived, and because the Sunni insurgency is fatigued. "What about all the bodies? What about all the bombings?" Indeed, it's the worst it has been, but not the worst it can be. I see many hopeful signs that cannot be dismissed.
August 6, 2006:
The battle for Baghdad can be won by the Iraqi government and Coalition forces in three weeks. There is a one month opening until mid-September to convince Iraq's middle class — the people who run the country and keep it together — that the state is still salvageable. Otherwise, with the summer drawing to a close, they will have to decide whether their exile and hiding is going to be of a more permanent nature and will plan ahead accordingly. The good news is that Sunni insurgency is exhausted and there is plenty of internal chatter questioning just how long they can keep up the pace of the violence.
June 16, 2006:
[After Zarqawi's death] Strategically, there is some more good news for Iraq. The jihadists will get increasingly frustrated with the Iraqi battlefield, and will seek out greener pastures. For any talented leader craving the limelight as the No. 1 Terrorist, the jihad in Iraq will always be associated with Zarqawi's name, and none other will eclipse this dark legacy. Such a wannabe will need to find somewhere else in the Middle East to make a name for himself.
Just who is this guy and why would he write the same stuff over and over and over?
Nibras Kazimi is a visiting scholar at the Hudson Institute. He also writes a weekly column on the Middle East for the New York Sun. Previously, he directed the Research Bureau of the Iraqi National Congress in Washington DC and Baghdad, and was a pro-bono advisor for the Higher National Commission for De-Ba'athification, which he helped establish and staff.
Golly, what a sterling record of accuracy and achievement...if that means American Tax-Payer subsidized bullshit that has completely fucked up everything it has ever touched except for the blowhards who made money off the deal. Oh well, maybe he has the office next to this pillar of "integritude".
No axe to grind here.
Meanwhile lookie here:
One of the Iraq government's critical tasks to pacify the country is to rein in the excesses of de-Baathification.
The man in charge of the effort is Ahmad Chalabi, the controversial Iraqi Shiite ex-patriate who formerly headed the Iraqi National Congress, lobbied hard for regime change, and was a key link in the chain of inaccurate intelligence about Saddam Hussein's alleged weapons of mass destruction program.
A top State Department official told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Thursday that Chalabi's de-Baathification committee is not making the changes needed to ease the economic and political restrictions on former Baathists.
Don't you love it when fucked up plans keep coming together?