Behind the scenes, British officials believed the U.S. administration was already committed to a war that they feared was ill-conceived and illegal and could lead to disaster.
The documents indicate that the officials foresaw a host of problems that later would haunt both governments -- including thin intelligence about the nature of the Iraqi threat, weak public support for war and a lack of planning for the aftermath of military action. British cabinet ministers, Foreign Office diplomats, senior generals and intelligence service officials all weighed in with concerns and reservations. Yet they could not dissuade their counterparts in the Bush administration -- nor, indeed, their own leader -- from going forward.
Therein lies the beginning of a substantial article about the documents known as the Downing Street Memos (though its really more than a half-dozen documents from several months before the war). The article states it was substantiated by several officials on both sides, none of whom questioned the documents' authenticity (that one is especially for you Cap'n).
British concerns over the direction of Iraq policy began long before July 2002. By the end of January of that year, officials said, the British Embassy in Washington informed London that U.S. military planning for an invasion of Iraq had begun...
The article is more tilted toward the British view of the matter with Washington natureally, but it reveals that Washington was determined to have their little war, and myopic with their plans for afterward. In other words, the usual Bush Administration Bullshit.
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